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In this paper we evaluate wage differentials in Italy combining gender and 
education perspectives. The main goal of the article is to verify whether the extent 
of the gender pay gap varies between highly- and low-educated workers, and 
whether or not the role played by gender differences in characteristics and in 
market rewards is similar in the two groups. We apply quantile regression analysis 
and an adaptation of the procedure suggested by Machado and Mata (2005) to 
evaluate the predicted wage gap at different levels of education, at different points 
of the female wage distribution scale. The analysis is carried out on the Italian 
sample of the last available year of the European Community Household Panel 
(2001). We show that the extent and the trend of the gap predicted across the 
female distribution is sharply different between groups with diverse educational 
levels. In the case of low-educated workers, although the predicted gap is largely 
explained by differences in rewards, lower levels of education or experience are 
however responsible for the gap, especially on the right-hand side of the 
distribution. On the contrary, highly-educated females have better characteristics 
than highly-educated men that partially compensate the rather high difference in 
returns, in particular at the extremes of the distribution. It thus follows that the 
unexplained part of the predicted gap reveals a glass ceiling effect only for more 
highly-educated females. 
 
JEL classification: J31, J71, C31  
Keywords: Human capital, Gender wage differentials, Quantile regressions. 
1.  Introduction 
The European Commission’s most recent focus on gender earnings disparities, 
published in 2005 and based on the 2002 Structure of Earnings Survey, confirms 
the persistence of gender wage differentials across the EU with a marginal 
reduction compared to year 1995. The gender pay gap, defined as the average 
earnings of all full-time female employees divided by average earnings of all full-
time male employees, calculated on gross hourly earnings, was equal to 77% in 
2002, compared to 75% in 1995 (European Commission, 2005).  
In explaining the extent of the gap, the European Commission turns its attention to 
the large role played in the occupational structure by sex and, furthermore, by 
gender differences in educational attainment that would appear exclude women 
from the best paid jobs. The level of education is still the most relevant selection 
criterion for non-manual jobs   especially at the top of the occupational hierarchy. 
On the opposite, when the educational level increases sharply for both sexes, men 
and women end up doing more similar jobs and occupations, as one would 
intuitively expect, and the gender wage gap decreases.  
The European Commission’s relevant point is that female-male wage gaps 
strongly depend on the type of occupation and, most of all, on the level of 
education. The fundamental matter for the European Commission is that both 
highly- and low-educated individuals, independently of sex, hold distinct skills 
and competences and enter different occupations; worker’s educational levels 
strongly determine the type of occupation and the wage level individuals can 
aspire to and also the extent of gender wage differentials
1. In Italy, the European 
Commission evaluates a gender pay gap, as defined above, of about 80%. In the 
comparative analysis, Italy comes across as one of the countries with the smallest 
extent of segregation and with a limited overall gender earnings gap. Relative 
earnings of women as a percentage of those of men are particularly high in those 
sectors that, on average, display the highest levels of earnings compared to other 
activities. Therefore, when Italian women  reach those well-paid occupations, they 
suffer the lowest wage differentials with respect to their male colleagues.  
An initial discussion on gender pay gaps by education, in line with the dichotomy 
between highly- and low-educated workers, was proposed by Katz and Murphy in 
1992. Although the focus of that contribution was primarily on the evolution of 
relative wage changes between high school and college graduates though the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the study clearly showed that raw gender wage 
differentials can differ substantially between workers with different education 
levels, and that shifts in labour demand towards more educated workers can help 
to interpret changes in competitive skill prices. However, the study did not go into 
aspects related to the incidence on gender wage differentials of skill differences 
and skill prices, and did not evaluate the extent of the gap “unexplained” by 
differences in productive characteristics. 
An initial study on gender wage differentials by education broken down in terms 
of differences in productive characteristics and in the rewards based on these 
characteristics has recently been carried out by de la Rica et al. (2008) on the 

1The drawback of the European Commission study is that much of the analysis is carried out on 
the raw wage gap, which incorporates the component of the differential attributable to female-male 
differences in productive characteristics. 
Spanish sample of the European Household Panel Data (ECHP). As for the Italian 
case, an initial attempt to deal with gender wage differentials and education was 
discussed in Favaro and Magrini (2008), where young workers’ gender wage 
differentials were analysed on matched employee-employer administrative data by 
means of a distributional approach.  
In this article we follow on from the literature discussed above and provide an 
initial general evaluation of the Italian gender pay gap in relation to individual 
educational endowments, in line with the scheme arising from the literature on 
vertical earning differences between highly- and low-educated workers, which 
demonstrates that workers with different educational levels are destined to occupy 
working positions at different levels of competence; hence they are 
complementary in production and unevenly affected by market openness, the 
globalisation process and technological innovation.  
 
The main aim of this article is to verify whether the dichotomy between highly- 
and low-educated workers does also imply, as expected, different patterns of 
gender pay gaps. The methodology we apply is a combination of econometric 
quantile estimation, in order to derive estimates of returns to individual 
characteristics across female wage distributions, and the Machado and Mata 
(2005) procedure in order to derive marginal distributions of predicted and 
counterfactual wages. By means of these methodologies, we are able to split the 
raw wage gap at any decile of the female marginal wage distribution into its 
components due to differences in characteristics or in rewards.
2  
The paper is structured as follows: in Paragraph 2 we discuss the main 
international literature on gender wage differentials adopting a distributional 
approach and the contributions on the role of education in explaining the gap. In 
Paragraph 3 we clarify the methodological issues and discuss the technique used 
to break down the wage gap across the distribution. The model is then estimated 
by using a sample of full-time employees drawn from the most recent available 
data from the European Community Household Panel (2001), as described in 
Paragraph 4. Results of the estimations and of wage gap decompositions are then 
presented in Paragraph 5.  
 
2. Gender pay gaps across female wage distributions and educational 
attainment: recent empirical contributions in European countries 
Research on gender wage differentials has been improved during the last decade 
by overcoming the Oaxaca and Blinder approach (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973), 
whose pioneering contribution in the early 1970s legitimized the developing 
literature on the topic and brought in the fundamental distinction between the two 
components of the estimated pay gap: the one due to gender differences in 
productive characteristics and the second due to the differences in the rewards 
associated with those characteristics. The latest contributions to the topic (Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Jenkins, 1994; Fortin and Lemieux, 1998; Machado 

2For a methodological discussion on different approaches to the analysis of gender wage gaps, we 
suggest the report for the European Commission carried out by Beblo et al. (2003). 
and Mata, 2005) all note (albeit with different propositions and goals
3) the need 
for a gender comparison of pay gaps across the whole range of wages, and not 
only in correspondence with average values, as previously performed. These 
methodologies have led to substantial progress in the research, as they allow for 
the comprehension of how wage differentials are distributed right across female 
wage ranges, and present good potential for the identification of “fragile” 
occupational positions, and obstacles to wage progressions and occupational 
careers (different access to promotion). Applying the distributional approaches to 
the analysis of gender wage differentials has made it possible to highlight the 
uneven distribution of earning that penalises working women, especially affecting 
females whose earning capacity is either very low or higher than the average, 
shedding light on cases of the glass ceiling or sticky floor effects.  
 
One of the first investigations on gender wage gaps across the distribution, 
applying the quantile regression analysis and a preliminary version of the 
Machado and Mata (2005) methodology
4 to derive marginal distributions of 
female predicted and counterfactual wages, was undertaken by Albrecht et al. 
(2003), in a study based on data from the Swedish Level of Living Surveys. 
Investigating the trend of the wage gap over time, the authors find evidence in 
favour of the existence of a glass ceiling pattern, and show that the gap at the top 
of the wage distribution, at least in Sweden, is a phenomenon of the 1990s. 

3 Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Fortin and Lemieux (1998) and the most recent contribution by 
Machado and Mata (2005) propose a comparison between female and male wages at different 
points of the distributions. Jenkins (1994), on the other hand, advises estimating female gaps 
individually and thereafter to analyse the distribution of those gaps.  
4 They had access to a preliminary version of the paper entitled “Counterfactual decomposition of 
changes in wage distributions using quantile regression”, made available in February 2000. 
Moreover, they demonstrate that high wage differentials at the top of the female 
wage distribution are mostly explained by differences in the rewards associated 
with different productive characteristics. In a later work, Albrecht et al. (2004) 
analyse the wage gap in the Netherlands on a sample of full-time workers selected 
from the 1992 Labour Supply Panel of the Dutch Institute for Labour Studies and 
applying quantile regression estimates taking the selection process for full-time 
work into account
5. Their results are consistent with the existence, also in the 
Netherlands, of a glass ceiling pattern and a high incidence of gender differences 
in rewards. Moreover, they show that, when adjusting for selection into full-
employment, the wage gap becomes larger, highlighting the occurrence of a 
strong positive selection into full-time work among women in the Netherlands.  
The quantile regression methodology used to estimate earning functions in 
correspondence to different wage levels was also applied to Spain by Gardeazàbal 
and Ugidos (2005) on a sample selected from the 1995 Spanish Survey of Wage 
Structure
6. They show that gender differences in terms of returns on 
characteristics are responsible for a higher gap at the bottom of the distribution. 
Garcìa  et al. (2001), on the other hand, using a different dataset (the 1991 
Encuesta de Conciencia, Biografia y Estructura de Clase) and correcting for non-
random selection of women in employment and for the endogeneity of education, 
come up with the opposite result, e.g. an increasing wage gap moving from the 
bottom to the top of female wage distribution.  

5 Given the high proportion of Dutch women in part-time work, they control for full-time 
employment selection.  
6The dataset covers employees in firms with ten or more workers and excludes the following 
production sectors: Agriculture, Public Administration, Health Services and Education. 
Arulampalam et al. (2007) present quantile regression analyses on a sample of 
European countries
7 and study the wage gap in the private and public sectors 
separately. In most of the countries analysed (including Italy), they confirm the 
unequal incidence of the gap along the distribution of female wages, with wider 
wage differentials at top of the distribution scale. However, they show different 
extents of the wage gap between private and public sectors: higher wage gaps are 
found at both tails of the distribution of wages of private employees; in contrast, 
females working in the public sector suffer higher gaps only at the top of the 
distribution. This result holds true also in the Italian sample. 
 
The above-discussed studies analyse the incidence of education on wage 
differentials by including individually attained educational levels among the 
explanatory variables of the wage equation. Education, in forming part of the 
productive characteristics of hourly wages, concurs as one of the components of 
the wage gap due to differences in characteristics, as well as of the wage 
differential ascribed to those characteristics’ rewards. Conversely, Katz and 
Murphy’s seminal work published in 1992, by studying raw wage differentials 
between men and women by educational level, clearly highlighted the role of 
education in determining the skill-content of occupations that individuals with 
different educational levels can access, and therefore, the existence of different 
earning capacities between highly- and low-educated workers. Katz and Murphy 
(1992) suggested that a separate study of highly- and low-educated worker’s 
wages is meaningful.  

7A recent comparative analysis of gender average wage gaps and female employment can be 
found in Pissarides et al. (2005). 
Only recently has Katz and Murhpy’s proposition been taken up by de la Rica et 
al. (2008) studying Spanish wage differentials by workers’ educational levels and 
decomposing the raw pay gap for each educational group into the two different 
components. De la Rica et al. (2008), using the sample of full-time workers 
selected from the 1999 cross-sectional Spanish data of the European Community 
Household Panel and applying the Machado and Mata (2005) methodology, show 
how the extent of the hourly wage gap follows two different patterns — along 
respective wage distributions — in the two subsamples considered: highly-
educated women suffer a higher gap at the top of the distribution, while low-
educated females are most penalised at the bottom. Moreover, in correspondence 
with the highest wage differentials, most of the gap is explained by differences in 
the rewards for certain characteristics. According to the authors, these results are 
consistent with the existence of a glass ceiling effect for highly-educated working 
women and of a sticky floor effect for the low-educated.  
A different effort in the direction of studying the relationship between education 
and gender wage differentials is made by Favaro and Magrini (2008), who 
propose a distributional analysis of the wage gap based on the evaluation of 
bivariate density functions defined, as suggested by Jenkins (1994), on individual 
predicted and counterfactual wages. Using administrative data (supplied by the 
Italian Social Security Offices – INPS) on the universe of young workers 
employed full-time in some Italian provinces, the authors firstly estimate wage 
equations on the whole population in function of human capital and other  
productive characteristics
8; they then evaluate both the extent of the unexplained 
wage gap and its probability of occurring by non-parametric estimates of bivariate 
density functions conditioned on human capital characteristics; the procedure 
makes it possible to derive bivariate probability distributions, defined on predicted 
and counterfactual individual wages, conditioned on different educational levels 
and human capital accumulated in the labour market. Favaro and Magrini show 
that highly educated young women suffer, in general, lower levels of wage 
discrimination than low-educated females; however, highly-educated women at 
the top of the distribution have been experiencing increasing wage gaps due to 
differences in rewards for characteristics ever since the end of the 1990s, showing 
the rise of the glass ceiling effect. 
 
3. Methodological issues 
The empirical investigation we carry out is based on the application of 
econometric quantile estimates   deriving decile values of returns on individual 
characteristics across female and male wage distributions   and the Machado and 
Mata (2005) procedure   obtaining marginal distributions of predicted and 
counterfactual wages. Once marginal distributions are constructed, we decompose 
the difference between female and male predicted wages, observed at any decile, 
into its components due to differences in estimated characteristics’ rewards and to 
differences in characteristics evaluated at the relative decile.  

8Since the dataset does not include information on individual level of education, Favaro and 
Magrini construct a proxy of education by checking worker’s first non-seasonal entrance into the 
labour market. In addition, they instrument education with a measure of the supply-side of the 
educational system .   
The econometric procedure is developed by estimating quantile regressions on 
separate wage equations for female and male wage functions (Koenker and 
Bassett, 1982; Buchinsky, 1998), by assuming that wage functions are centred on 
different quantiles of the wage distribution; given the covariates vector z, 
estimates   z   Q   correspond to the   -th quantile of the distribution of the log 
wage (), evaluated at any   0,1    .  
The quantile regression model is assumed to be linear: 
 
    	 
  u z           ( 1 )  
Where   is the log of wages,     is a vector of coefficients, the quantile 
regression coefficients. The distribution of the error term   u  is unspecified and it 
is simply assumed that   0 z u Q 
   . 
The estimated values of the   -th quantile of log wages, conditioned on covariates 
z, is equal to:      	 
  ˆ z z Q . For the given   0,1    ,       can be estimated by 
minimising in       the following expression
9: 
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i        ( 3 )  

9 We estimate the vector of coefficients       simultaneously, by means of the bootstrapping 
procedure that makes possible to test whether coefficients of different quantile regressions are 
significantly different pair-on-pair.  
 
Following the above described procedure, we come up with estimated values of 
quantile coefficients for females (
f ˆ
  ) and males (
m ˆ
  ), at any   -th quantile.  
Given the estimated coefficients, we derive the marginal distributions of predicted 
and counterfactual female wages by applying the Albrecht et al. (2003) 
methodology.
10 Female predicted wages, at any point of the   observation are 
theoretical wages that female workers can earn given their characteristics and the 
estimated rewards recognised to those characteristics, 
f ˆ
  ; female counterfactual 
wages are wages that women would be paid if female characteristics were 
rewarded at male returns, 
m ˆ
  .  
In order to construct female marginal distributions, either predicted or 
counterfactual, along with the marginal distribution of male predicted wages, we 
proceed as follows: 
 We draw on the female sample and construct predicted wages by 
multiplying characteristics  f z  of every chosen individual by 
f ˆ
  , at any   . We 
repeat that operation N=100 times for all quantiles, ending up with the 
marginal distribution of female predicted wages, 
f
f ˆ z   	 . We apply the same 
procedure to the male sample to obtain the marginal distribution of male 
predicted wages, 
m
m ˆ z   	 . The difference between male and female marginal 

10 Albrecht et al. (2003) adopt a simplified version of the methodology proposed by Machado and 
Mata in a mimeo that was later published in the Journal of Applied Econometrics (Machado and 
Mata, 2005).  
distributions, evaluated at any   , represents the predicted gap, evaluated at 
decile    and expressed in terms of female wages.  
 We repeat the operation described above but apply male coefficients, 
m ˆ
  , 
to female characteristics, to trace the marginal distribution of female 
counterfactual wages. 
 We use female and male marginal wage distributions (
f
f ˆ z   	  and 
m
mˆ z   	  
respectively) to evaluate the predicted wage gap in terms of female wages. 
 We use female marginal and counterfactual distributions, 
f
f ˆ z   	 and 
m
f ˆ z   	 , 
to evaluate the part of the predicted wage gap due to different gender rewards 
to characteristics.  

4. Definition of the empirical model and categorisation of workers by 
education using ECHP information 
The analysis is carried out on the sample of Italian employed workers aged 15 to 
65, working full-time
11, selected from the 8
th wave
12 of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). As usual in the analysis of the wage gap, we focus on 
employed workers and do not take the self-employed into account, whose 
information on hours worked and earnings is hardly comparable to that of 
employees.  

11Part-time jobs are mainly held by women. The percentage of women employed part-time, out of 
the total employed, is 9.7% against 1.7% of men. We exclude part-time workers due to imperfect 
information in the ECHP, on the number of hours they effectively work. 
12The most recent wave available, for the year 2001.  
The model we estimate is a Mincerian wage equation in which the logarithm of 
the wage rate (gross hourly wage)
13 is assumed to be explained by individual 
productive characteristics, such as education and experience (general and 
specific); in addition, we include variables related to the demand side of the 
labour market (for instance size of the firm and activity sector), institutional 
features (such as contract type: permanent, temporary and other types of 
contracts), and macro-regional effects, summarising the incidence of market 
characteristics (such as local unemployment rate, availability of childcare 
services, etc.) on wage levels.  
Our empirical model is similar to wage functions recently estimated on other 
countries’ samples selected from the ECHP dataset (Arulampalam et al., 2007; de 
la Rica et al., 2008); however, since the dataset supplies information on the 
occupational content of jobs (principal activity performed and degree of 
responsibility), we include also controls for those aspects, whose relation to wage 
rates can be substantial.  
The preliminary issue in a study by educational levels is which principle should 
be followed to categorise the sample; e.g. which educational threshold should be 
fixed to delineate educational sub-samples. Studies on the wage gap between 
highly- and low-educated workers, and on the effects that globalisation, 
international trade and migration have on inter-education wage gaps, commonly 
distinguished between workers with a university degree and workers with lower 
educational levels.  

13The wage rate is calculated following the procedure generally exploited when using the ECHP 
dataset: we divide (gross) monthly current wage and salary earnings from the main job by the 
number of weekly hours worked (in the main job) multiplied by the monthly standard number of 
weeks (4.3).  
In our analysis we apply a different criterion, separating workers with a 
compulsory educational level from those with a higher level diploma. We chose 
this categorisation because it better fits the structure of the Italian educational 
system and the related occupational opportunities. In Italy, compulsory schooling 
sums a total of  up to eight years, subdivided in two cycles: the first, up to five 
years of primary school (the so called “scuola elementare”) and the second, three 
years of lower-secondary school (“scuola secondaria inferiore”). Individuals end 
the compulsory cycle, and decide whether to keep on studying when they are 
between 13 and 14 years old. If they decide to stay in school and enter the so-
called upper stage of secondary education (“scuola secondaria superiore”), they 
can choose between different educational paths, some more technical-
mathematical and other more humanistic. Whatever the case may be, if they 
complete the whole cycle of studies, they are allowed to enter university. This 
educational structure leads to quite a strong categorisation in the labour market 
between individuals with a compulsory educational level and those with a higher 
degree of study. As Table 1 shows
14, the former are mainly forced to enter low-
skilled operative and blue-collar employment while the latter have access to 
clerical occupations and, if they have a university degree, may have better access 
to managerial positions.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 

14 All descriptive statistics and results reported in the paper are calculated on samples of 
individuals of 15-65 years old, employed full-time.   
Highly-educated women are largely concentrated in the top three occupational 
categories: around 44% or women with post-compulsory levels of schooling work 
either as technicians, professionals, legislators, senior officials or managers. The 
proportion on the same occupations is slightly lower for highly-educated men and 
amounts to around 35%. On the contrary, the low-educated are misrepresented in 
top occupations: only 4% of women and around 3% of men. 
In light of these considerations, we believe it appropriate to classify workers with 
a compulsory level of education as low-educated, and individuals with at least a 
post-compulsory school diploma as highly-educated. In international terms, this 
corresponds to distinguishing between educational levels ISCED 0-2 and ISCED 
3-7. Given this categorisation, the information available in the ECHP dataset 
makes it possible to define some control dummies for individuals with a third 
level of education (ISCED 5-7) that will be included in the estimates related to the 
highly-educated group.  
Figure 1 shows kernel density functions of hourly wages of men and women 
employed full-time (aged 15-64), based on the educational groups defined above; 
the distance between men and women’s distribution densities at any point 
represents the extent of the raw gap. In both groups, the differential is in favour of 
men, although its extent is sharply higher for low-educated than for highly-
educated women at any wage level, as it is clear from Table 2, which summarises 
information on the raw gap, the predicted gap and its components, and which will 
be discussed later.  
 
[Figure 1 here]  
 
Now we go through the estimation procedure and the discussion of the 
decomposition of the predicted wage gap. 
In a Mincerian-type wage equation, much of the role in explaining wage rates is 
attributed to human capital components, in particular education and experience. 
As previously explained, the subsample of low-educated workers is pretty 
homogeneous; the highly-educated subsample, on the other hand, includes 
workers with either a second stage of secondary level or tertiary level education. 
Therefore, to the wage equation we add a dummy to capture the effect of any type 
of university degree.  
With regard to human capital other than formal education, the information 
available in the dataset allows us to construct two different variables: one for 
general experience (labour market experience) and a second for firm-specific 
experience. We are able to compute experience accumulated in the labour market 
in terms of the total number of years spent working, in theory, since the first 
employment. This is a continuous variable and, as is generally assumed, enters the 
wage equation in quadratic form to capture its increasing effect, but to a 
decreasing degree, on wages.  
A degree of caution is generally advisable when using such a “theoretical” 
measure of experience, which may not correspond to the effective years spent in 
the labour market. Indeed, that proxy does not take into account periods of 
absence from the labour market, due to unemployment, inactivity, or simply 
illness or parenthood. If this were the case, theoretical experience would 
overestimate the real number of years of working activity. This measurement  
problem arises in both the male and female samples; however, as empirical 
evidence shows, the problem is more serious for females, due to interruptions 
caused by maternity leave. For that reason, we partially solve this issue by adding 
the interaction of experience with the number of children among the explicatory 
variables. While it is true that having children implies a certain interruption of 
working activity and as well as a degree of penalisation in terms of experience, we 
should detect a negative impact of that variable on the level of wages. However, 
since gross wages include components of maternity allowance, we may even 
detect some positive effect with regard to low levels of income, for which 
financial assistance for childcare systems is provided.  
 
A relevant part of workers’ experience is built up inside the firm and assumes a 
more specific skill base than general knowledge. Therefore, we include among the 
regressors the variable “tenure” by using the available information on the number 
of years spent in the firm. However, the ECHP dataset supplies information on the 
exact period spent with the current employer if less than 15 years; longer periods 
are registered only by classes. In order to use a homogeneous measure of tenure 
(independently of the tenure period) and not to exclude any observation from the 
dataset, we construct different dummies taking the value of 1 if the period is five 




15 We checked for a correlation between the variables of “experience” and “tenure”. An intital 
check was carried out on the continuous variables, for the subsample of workers with less than 15 
years of company service; correlation levels in that case amount to 0.5 both for females and males 
when highly-educated, falling to 0.25 for low-educated women and to 0.15 for low-educated men. 
The correlation evaluated between experience and tenure dummies (the specification we use in the  
Among the regressors we also include variables related to productive sectors
16, 
firm size and occupational characteristics; moreover, unlike previous analyses of 
gender wage differentials carried out on the ECHP, we add control elements for 
each occupational category, in order to reflect differences in wages due to 
professional characteristics
17. Finally, using information on the employee’s 
position in her/his business or organisation, we also check for the degree of 
responsibility s/he declares to have in her/his job. The worker is asked if s/he 
supervises or co-ordinates the work of any personnel and, if so, whether s/he has 
any say in their pay or promotion. On the base of those questions, the database 
defines a categorical variable with value zero if the worker declares not to have 
any supervisory or co-ordination position in the business, value 1 if s/he answers 
positively to the first question, but negatively to the second, and value 2 if the 
interviewee answers positively to both questions. This information allows us to 
define three dummy variables capturing the degree of supervision in the work 
place: a high, an intermediate and a non-existent supervisory role. 
To complete the model specification, we include variables related to bargaining 
characteristics, distinguishing permanent employment from fixed- or short-term 

estimates) is mainly negative, and in absolute value is lower than 0.5 for both sexes, independently 
of educational levels. Correlation becomes positive and assumes values around 0.6 only for 
women and men with tenure longer than 15 years; still, it is not a high level.  
16 Public versus private sector and economic aggregates versus private sectors: agriculture, 
industry and services. 
17 We refer to the International Labour Office classification. The profession of reference is “Sales 
and services elementary occupations”. Dummy variables are included for the following 
occupational categories: physical, mathematical, engineering, life science and health professionals, 
teaching professionals, other professionals; physical, mathematical, engineering, life science and 
health associate professionals, teaching and other technical professionals; office and customer 
services clerks; personal and protective services workers; models, salespersons and demonstrators; 
skilled agricultural and fishery workers; craft and related trades, and extraction and building trade 
workers; metal, machinery, precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trades workers.  
jobs and other types of contracts
18, and macro-regional dummies to capture 
territorial differences due to different bargaining rules and labour market contexts.  
 
A summary of the statistics of the variables used in the estimates is to be found in 
the Appendix (Table A1). In average terms, the raw hourly gap is against female 
workers, for both educational levels, and it is significantly higher in the case of 
low-educated than highly-educated women: highly-educated women suffer, on 
average, an 8% gap, against a 14% one in the case of the low-educated. However, 
observing Figure 1 and Table 2, we may also note that the range of the wage gap 
across the distribution is notably different between highly- and low-educated 
women; in the former case the gap oscillates between 5.9% and 11.3%, while in 
the latter case it varies between 7.2% and almost 18%. In general, while highly-
educated women narrow the gap when moving from the lowest deciles to the 
median value of the distribution, and lose that gain when they reach higher wage 
levels, wage differences between low-educated females and males show an 
increasing path up to the fifth decile before tending to diminish as women move 
towards the best rewarded positions.  
With regard to human capital characteristics, we may observe a slightly higher 
proportion of women than men with a tertiary educational level. Since the sample 
includes employees up to 65-year-old, this figure confirms the substantial 
educational upgrading of young females. On the other hand, as to other human 
capital characteristics accumulated after formal education (e.g. experience and 
tenure), men register the highest average levels.  

18We summarise in the “other types of contract” category the categories defined by the ECHP as 
“casual work with no contract” and “other arrangements”.  
A few other remarks on sample characteristics are interesting to note. Firstly, 
independently of the educational level, women are more concentrated in small 
firms than men are, and are more likely to be employed with fixed-term or short-
term contracts. However, being highly-educated facilitates access to permanent 
occupations: the frequency of temporary contracts decreases when workers, either 
male or female, are highly-educated.  
5. Decomposing the wage gap across the distributions 
In this section, we shall discuss the main results of the econometric analysis, 
through which we determine the estimates of the rewards to the characteristics and 
obtain predicted hourly wages for men and women, evaluated at any decile level 
by means of quantile regressions. After that, we shall examine the marginal 
distribution of female and male wages, acquired by means of the Machado and 
Mata procedure discussed in Paragraph 3, and decompose the predicted gaps 
across the distributions into two components: one ascribed to differences by 
gender in productive characteristics (the “explained” part of the gap), the other 
due to differences in returns for the same characteristics (the “unexplained” part 
of the gap). The discussion of the results of both the econometric analysis and the 
gap decomposition will highlight the appropriateness of studying gender wage 
differences by educational levels. At least in the Italian case, there are glaring 
differences by education in the extent of the gap and the contribution of the 
different components across the wage distribution. 
The econometric model has been already explained in Paragraph 3; we might only 
point out that unlike wage regressions previously carried out on ECHP, our  
specification includes professional categories and the degree of responsibility 
assumed by the individual in her/his job.  
Estimation results are shown in the Appendix (Tables A2 and A3). We may note 
that the first relevant differences between highly- and low-educated workers 
emerge as to the rewards for human capital characteristics: independently of sex, 
both general and specific experience and the degree of responsibility on the job 
significantly concur to determine wage levels across the distribution of most 
educated workers. However, we may assert that human capital characteristics do 
not contribute substantially to the determination of the wages of low-educated 
workers, either men or women; in that case, the primary role in determining wage 
levels seems to be played by what we may call institutional factors, such as the 
economic sector of activity, the contractual framework, firm size and regional 
context. The difference between the two groups of workers is supported by the 
analysis on the statistical significance of the test on the equality of coefficients 
evaluated at different deciles, carried out for every estimated parameter 
considered individually, and for the set of human capital coefficients considered 
jointly.
19  
The results of the investigation carried out on the set of human capital variables 
are shown in Table A4 in the Appendix; they appear to back up the use of the 
quantile regression methodology, in particular with reference to the group of the 
highly-educated. For the subsample of these workers, the values of the tests reject 

19 The test on the significance of the difference between decile coefficients has been carried out on 
every single variable, in order to verify the usefulness of carrying out quantile regressions. We do 
not quote all the results due to space limits; instead, we opted for the shorter solution of discussing 
tests on the difference between couples of decile parameters on the set of human capital 
coefficients. We can supply the complete analysis on request. At any rate, we may assert that the 
complete analysis on the difference between decile coefficients has proved the need to estimate 
quantile regressions.   
the hypothesis of equality between different decile levels of all human capital 
coefficients; decile estimates appear significantly dissimilar for both sexes, not 
only between left and right-hand sides of the distributions but also between 
different deciles of the same distribution tail. Such differences are less 
pronounced across the wage distributions of low-educated workers; in this case, 
rewarding human capital characteristics is significantly different, especially 
between lower and upper deciles of the distributions.  
As for highly-educated workers, we might occupy a few lines briefly commenting 
on the estimated results. For this group of workers, the type of human capital 
accumulated after formal education plays a role of great relevance in explaining 
wage upgrading by gender; in line with the evidence emerging in the literature on 
gender wage differentials carried out in other countries and with the few studies 
on Italy, we find that male wages are more sensitive to general experience   
accumulated in the labour market   than to specific human capital built up in the 
firm where working at present; on the contrary, female wage upgrading strongly 
depends on specific experience. Going into detail, the return to general experience 
is positively significant for men, even though decreasing with the rise of the wage 
rate and insignificant at very high wage levels. On the other hand, it is only 
slightly significant for women, and only in correspondence to the first decile of 
the distribution and around the median value, its value furthermore being half that 
of men.  
Turning to the rewards for specific experience, measured by the permanence in 
the firm (variable “tenure”), our results appear to outline the existence of different 
models of economic reward by gender. Male workers are able to obtain a gradual  
increase in wages as the period of permanence in the firm increases, and that 
upgrading is recognised as from short periods of tenure. On the contrary, females 
achieve statistically significant rewards if the period of permanence in the firm 
becomes particularly long, precisely longer than ten years; indeed in that case, 
returns are higher than what men receive. Likewise, if male workers have 
supervisory roles in the firm, they get incremental rewards as coordination tasks 
become more relevant. On the other hand, female workers with supervisory 
positions are able to achieve economic gratification for that position only if they 
get the highest degree of coordination or supervision of any personnel, 
corresponding to having a say in their own pay or promotion.  
 
The estimated coefficients are applied to obtain female and male distributions of 
predicted wages   wages that men and women can earn given their respective 
characteristics   as explained in Paragraph 3. Since we express wage rates in 
logarithms, the difference between any male and female decile values of predicted 
marginal distributions is explicative of the gender percentage gap predicted at that 
point of the distribution, in terms female wages. For example, a 0.15 difference 
means that male wages are 15% higher than female wages
20.  
We break down the predicted gap, evaluated at different points of observation, 
into its components (as originally defined by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973)) 
only by the mean wage value: the component due to gender differences in 
productive characteristics and the part owed to differences in their rewards, the so-
called unexplained part of the gap. To evaluate the unexplained component of the 

20 A positive value states a wage gap in favour of men and, conversely, a negative wage gap points 
to wage differentials in favour of women.  
estimated wage gap, we construct counterfactual wages, i.e. wages that females 
might earn if their characteristics were rewarded as males’ are, as illustrated in 
Paragraph 3.
21 In accordance with the estimation procedure carried out for each 
decile of the original wage distributions, the predicted wage gap has been 
partitioned in its factors in correspondence with each decile of female and male 
predicted wage distribution.  
The figures included below summarise the whole analysis discussed up to this 
point. Apart from representing the results for highly- and low-educated workers 
separately, in accordance with the focus of the paper, we include a Figure for the 
whole sample of workers   the pooled model   (where highly- and low-educated 
workers enter indistinctly) to highlight how the results might have been if we had 
carried out the analysis on the whole sample of workers   without distinguishing 
between highly- and low-educated   as is usually done in the literature on the 
decomposition of the gender wage gap.
22 The error in evaluating wage 
differentials could be quite relevant if the two differently educated groups were 
jointly considered; on the other hand, separating by education makes it possible to 
recognise sharp dissimilarities between the two groups.  
Each Figure displays the extent, across deciles, of the raw gap (discussed in 
Paragraph 2), the predicted gap, and its “unexplained component”, put down to 

21The decomposition we discuss in this article is in terms of female wages and allows us to 
evaluate the gap women experience, the component due to gender differences in characteristics 
aside, i.e. the difference between their predicted wage and the wage they may earn if they were 
paid at males’ returns. Decomposing the wage gap in terms of male wages and, therefore, 
evaluating the unexplained part of the gap in terms of male characteristics, in a context where 
female characteristics are in general better than male characteristics, would overestimate the 
component of the gap due to differences in returns.  
22 The decomposition, in this case, is carried out on quantile estimates performed on the whole 
sample of workers, including both highly- and low-educated. We do not include those quantile 
estimate results in the Appendix because not in the objective of the paper. However, we would be 
glad to provide those results on request.  
gender differences in rewards for productive characteristics. In Table 2 we show 
the decile values of the wage gap in detail, and evaluate the part of the predicted 
gap at each decile due to differences in gender characteristics or rewards.  
 
[Figures 2, 3, 4 here] 
 
The comparison of the three Figures underlines the relevance of our research 
focus; it is evident that the wage gap, be it raw or predicted, follows different 
paths in the two groups considered and that, if the study were carried out on the 
whole sample, predictions on its trend across the distribution would have been 
completely different. Moreover, the analysis by education highlights the 
distinctive role played by gender differences in productive characteristics and 
those characteristics’ rewards in explaining the predicted wage gap.  
Considering the whole sample (Figure 2), the decreasing trend of the predicted 
gap across the female wage distribution would lead us to conclude that women 
experience a wage gap that decreases as they reach higher wage rates, and 
becomes positive at the upper limit of the distribution, in correspondence with the 
highest distribution decile. In addition to that, the decomposition procedure would 
lead us to conclude that women have much better productive characteristics than 
men have, and that the gap component due to differences in those factors explains 
a predicted wage gap in favour of women; moreover, female characteristics 
improve more than male characteristics do as wage levels increase, and therefore, 
the part of the gap explained by differences in characteristics becomes even more 
in favour of women, reaching more than 14% at the highest wage levels. On the  
other hand, in correspondence to the same wage deciles, the unexplained part of 
the gap amounts to almost 13% in favour of male workers (differences in rewards 
are highest at the extremes of the distribution). In conclusion, through a “pooled” 
analysis we would predict that female losses decrease as women reach the highest 
earnings levels; furthermore, female productive characteristics, by increasingly 
counterbalancing differences in rewards across the female wage distribution, 
allow women to turn the predicted wage gap to their favour at the highest wage 
rates.  
Those results are in line with the only existing analysis on Italy carried out on the 
ECHP using quantile regressions, the work of Arulampalam et al. (2007), who 
study gender wage gaps in the European countries by splitting the sample 
according to the sector of activity, be it public or private. Arulampalam et al., 
before proceeding in separate estimates between public and private sectors, briefly 
discuss the results of a pooled model including all workers (page 169). Their 
estimates, differently from ours, do not include occupational and sector dummies 
among the explicative variables, and it is probably for that reason that they obtain 
slightly higher predicted wage differentials and a larger percentage of the gap is 
explained by different returns. However, although our “pooled” model estimates 
well predict the raw gap (see Figure 2) and the decomposition outcomes are akin 
to the results of Arulampalam et al. (2007), they conceal striking differences 
between highly- and low-educated workers, as may be clearly observed 
comparing Figure 2 to the subsequent Figures.  
Figures 3 and 4 represent the trend of the gap across the deciles of distributions 
for highly- and low-educated female workers, considered separately, whose  
estimates are discussed above; they clearly show how the raw measure of the pay 
gap follows distinct patterns across the distributions of highly- and low-educated 
females, which would not be well represented by the pooled measures illustrated 
in Figure 2. In particular, in the case of low-educated females, the raw gap follows 
an increasing trend up to the median wage level, rising from 7% to 15.6%; after 
wards which it fluctuates but tends to decrease, reaching 12.7 percentage points, 
always in favour of males. If highly-educated, female workers suffer a wage gap 
against that is slightly higher than the wage gap affecting low-educated, at the 
lowest deciles of the distribution: the wage gap for highly educated amounts to 
10.5% at the bottom tail of the wage distribution. However, unlike what we 
observe for low-educated women, the raw gap decreases as women upgrade in 
terms of earnings capacity and tends towards a level of less than 6% at the seventh 
decile. Conversely, the gap grows again at the highest wage levels, reaching more 
than 11% at the top of the distribution. 
The predicted gap, contrary to what would emerge from only a pooled estimation, 
turns out to increase generally in both subsamples, although to a different extent. 
Low-educated females with especially low pay levels have predicted gaps around 
11% and 12% and the gap rises as wages increase, reaching 16% at the eighth 
decile; after which, the predicted gap undergoes a sharp decline, falling to 12.7% 
at the highest decile value. On the contrary, the predicted gap for highly-educated 
women initially decreases from 8 to 5% (between first and second deciles) and 
then turns back up to the seventh decile, reaching the highest magnitude at around 
10%. Then, at the top of the distribution the estimated value of the gap slightly 
fluctuates, with a clear upwards change at the highest decile (of about 2%),  
capturing the trend in the raw gap. In general, the extension of the pay gap for 
highly-educated women is 7-8% lower than it is for the low-educated.  
The most substantial differences between highly- and low-educated workers arise 
when decomposing predicted gaps. Looking at low-educated females, the part of 
the gap attributed to differences in characteristics’ rewards is lower than the 
predicted gap; in this case, across the whole wage distribution, gender differences 
in returns do not cover the whole prediction, meaning that part of the differential 
is explained by female productive characteristics, less than those that men have. 
That is particularly true at wage rates higher than the median value: low-educated 
women reaching the highest pay levels are not able to match male income profiles 
also because of their productive characteristics. However, better male 
characteristics are able to account for maximum 4.5% of the gap against women 
once at the eighth decile; indeed, across most of the distribution, the part of the 
gap explained by differences in characteristics in favour of men is lower than 2% 
and are cancelled at between the forth decile and the median value. At those 
points, females have productive characteristics similar to their male colleagues 
and the predicted gap coincides exactly with the gap due to differences in rewards. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
As for the results for highly-educated females, we note that the estimates of the 
gap imputed to differences in rewards for characteristics are steadily higher than 
the whole predicted gap, across the whole range of wages. In this case, at any 
wage level, female characteristics would explain wage differentials in favour of  
women, but this female advantage is eroded completely by differences in rewards. 
That is, independently of the wage level, highly-educated women experience gaps 
in rewards that more than compensate for the positive difference due to productive 
characteristics. Moreover, the gap in returns rises as wage rates increase, shifting 
from 8% at the bottom of the distribution to 14% at the top, and as a consequence, 
the economic advantage due to better characteristics is reduced itself as women 
upgrade their wage rates. 
The sharp difference we detect in the composition of the predicted wage gap by 
education and the high incidence, in the case of highly-educated women, of 
differences in characteristics’ rewards may suggest the possibility that highly-
educated Italian women are overeducated, or at least more overeducated than 
males, and that the pay penalty they suffer compared to their well-matched 
counterparts is higher than that experienced by males. This is a result that has 
been detected in other countries, for example in Northern Ireland by McGuinness 
and Bennett (2007), who study a sample of students completing a Higher 
Education programme, and find that overeducated males earn 11% less than their 
well-matched counterparts while overeducated females earn almost 23% less than 
adequately matched females.
23 As for Italy, Di Pietro and Urwin (2006)
24 find that 
Italian graduates whose level of education exceeds the adequate or formally 
required level of education for their job receive lower wages than their peers with 

23On the other hand, Groot (1996), studying a sample of British wage–earners of all educational 
levels, shows that in Britain the allocation of female workers is more efficient than the allocation 
of males and that the probability of being overeducated decreases with work experience. In this 
case, the result is likely to depend on the fact that workers of different educational levels have 
been considered together.  
24They study a sample of individuals who graduated from all Italian universities in 1998.   
a similar level of schooling in jobs for which they are suitably qualified. 
Unfortunately the authors do not present a gender analysis of the phenomenon. 
 
In conclusion, through our study we find that in the Italian case the pattern of 
female/male wage differentials is different between highly- and low-educated 
women and that a glass ceiling effect is detected only for highly-educated women, 
whose gap follows a steadily increasing trend across the whole distribution but 
especially at the top. Notwithstanding this, at those wage levels the predicted gap 
stabilises and even tends to decrease slightly, as a result of the good productive 
characteristics of highly-educated women earning top wages.  
In contrast, we do not detect either a glass ceiling or a sticky floor effect across 
the wage distribution of low-educated women; we observe in this case an 
increasing trend in both the predicted gap and the component due to differences in 
rewards as women upgrade from very low wage levels to the median value. On 
the other hand, the wage gap attributed to differences in rewards decreases as 
women approach wage levels higher than the median wage and, in particular, the 
top of the distribution. 
Our results differ somewhat from recent studies on gender wage differentials that 
analyse pooled samples of workers without splitting by education; in general they 
detect a disadvantage for all female workers due to differences in rewards that 
exceed the predicted gap. On the other hand, our study confirms part of the results 
of de la Rica et al. (2008) and the results of Favaro and Magrini (2008), who find 
different outcomes conditioned on education and a glass ceiling effect  
respectively for highly-educated women in Spain
25 and for young highly-educated 
females working in the Italian Venetian region. 
 
6. Conclusions
Our study arises from the interest in analysing gender wage differentials in Italy 
along the lines of a distributional approach, with the aim of verifying whether 
education affects the wage gap and its composition. The article contributes to the 
literature on the empirical analysis of gender wage differentials by means of 
distributional approaches. In this case, we apply quantile regression analysis and 
the Machado and Mata (2005) procedure to derive marginal distributions of 
female and male wages and the predicted gap. We then decompose that gap, at 
every decile of female wage distribution, in the component due to gender 
differences in characteristics and rewards.  
The analysis shows that female to male wage differentials in Italy strongly depend 
on workers’ education attainment: highly-educated women are affected by lower 
wage gaps than low-educated women, at any wage rate. Our outcomes predict a 
wage loss of women relative to men between 4.8% and 11.3% if highly-educated, 
and between 11.7% and 16.1% if low-educated. Moreover, the trend of the gap 
across the female wage distribution is rather different between the two groups: 
whereas the predicted gap of low-educated women tends to increase across the 
first part of the distribution and to settle around 15% at the median point, highly-
educated women’s predicted gap steadily raises from low to top wages, reaching 

25They also find a sticky floor pattern in the sample of low-educated females.  
around 16% at the eighth decile. It then slightly decreases among the very top of 
wages.  
The most interesting results are found when we evaluate the contribution to the 
gap of gender differences in characteristics and rewards: the decomposition 
procedure highlights relevant differences between differently educated workers. In 
the case of low-educated workers, female to male wage gaps depend on both 
higher rewards to male productive characteristics, compared to females, and lower 
female productive characteristics; the predicted gap is partially explained by a 
poorer composition of the female sample as compared to the male one, especially 
at high wage rates. Indeed, the wage gap attributed to gender differences in 
rewards reaches a maximum of around 15%. On the contrary, the component of 
the highly-educated wage gap ascribed to differences in rewards exceeds the 
predicted gap at any wage level; in this case, female characteristics are better than 
male ones, in particular at the left-hand end of the distribution. Therefore, the 
unexplained part of the predicted gap ranges between 8% and 14%. 
As to the existence of a glass ceiling or a sticky floor effect in female Italian wage 
pattern, our analysis highlights the persistence of a glass ceiling effect only for 
highly-educated women. On the other hand, we do not detect a sticky floor pattern 
in any group. 
 
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Table 1. Type of occupation in current job. Distribution by education and gender 
(%) 
 Highly-educated  Low-educated 
  Women   Men  Women   Men 
Legislators, senior officials and managers  0.59  4.49  0.26  0.49 
Professionals 26.97  11.87  0.51  0.10 
Technicians and associate professionals  16.63  19.09  3.58  2.34 
Clerks 38.39  27.83  15.86  7.50 
Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers 
10.04 8.26  18.67  10.33 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers  0.00  0.88  2.81  3.31 
Craft and related trades workers  2.85  13.31  21.74  37.23 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
1.67 9.46  10.23  18.52 
Elementary occupations  2.85  4.81  26.34  20.18 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1. Sample descriptive statistics 
 Low-educated    Highly-educated 
 Women  Men  Women  Men 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean  S.D. 
Log  hourly  wage  2.45 .33 2.59 .32 2.79 .42 2.87  .43 
Married/cohabiting  .63 .48 .71 .45 .64 .48 .66  .47 
Upper-stage of 
secondary education 
- - - -  .78  .41  .80  .40 
University  education  - - - -  .22  .41  .20  .40 
Experience  18.09 10.96 20.01 11.80 14.45  9.92  15.63  10.40 
Experience 
squared/10 
44.71 43.47 53.91 51.58 30.72 34.25 35.27  36.96 
Experience*Children 3.74 7.45 7.26  10.40  5.14 8.00 6.22  9.29 
Intermediate 
supervisory level 
.08 .27 .10 .30 .13 .33 .21  .41 
High supervisory 
level
.03 .17 .05 .21 .07 .26 .17  .37 
Tenure  6-10  years  .14 .35 .12 .32 .15 .36 .16  .36 
Tenure  11-15  years .12 .33 .10 .30 .11 .32 .11  .31 
Tenure more than 15 
years  
.31 .46 .33 .47 .34 .47 .36  .48 
Public  Sector  .19 .39 .23 .42 .55 .50 .39  .49 
Agriculture  .06 .24 .07 .25 .00 .05 .02  .15 
Services  .59 .49 .44 .50 .87 .33 .65  .48 
Fixed-term or short-
term contract 
.11 .32 .07 .26 .07 .26 .05  .22 
Other  contract  .09 .29 .08 .27 .03 .16 .02  .02 
Firm size: 5-19 
employees 
.36 .48 .32 .47 .27 .44 .24  .24 
Firm size: 20-49 
employees 
.16 .37 .13 .34 .17 .38 .19  .19 
Firm size 50-99 
employees 
.08 .28 .08 .27 .12 .32 .12  .12 
Firm  size: 100-499 
employees 
.11 .31 .11 .31 .15 .36  .170  .17 
Firm  size: more than 
500 employees 
.06 .24 .09 .28 .09 .29 .15  .15 
North-west  .08 .28 .07 .25 .12 .32 .10  .10 
North-east  .16 .36 .01 .29 .12 .32 .11  .11 
South  and  Islands  .20 .40 .35 .48 .25 .43 .28  .28 
Source: Descriptive statistics on ECHP 2001 sample  
Table A2a. Quantile regressions. Highly-educated women  


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2  .378 .335 .319 .322 .328 .349 .377 .410 .437 
Observations 831 
t-values in brackets.   
Table A2b. Quantile regressions. Highly-educated men  


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2  .313 .304 .309 .318 .329 .353 .380 .412 .453 
Observations 1044 
t-values in brackets.   
Table A3a. Quantile regressions. Low educated women  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































2  .446 .343 .285 .252 .236 .235 .240 .269 .330 
Observations 288 
t-values in brackets.  
 
  
Table A3b. Quantile regressions. Low educated men  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































2  .286 .229 .219 .209 .201 .205 .202 .201 .207 
Observations 742 
t-values in brackets.  
 
Table A4. Tests on the hypothesis of equality between decile human capital-related 
coefficients. F-values (Prob>F)§  
Highly-educated Low-educated 
 Women  Men  Women  Men 
Couples of deciles         
        
10
th-20
th   .98 (.45)  .64 (.76)  .59 (.78)  1.03 (.41) 
10
th-30
th  1.96 (.04)*  1.35 (.21)  .82 (.58)  1.17 (.31) 
10
th-40
th  2.46 (.01)*  1.46 (.16)  1.06 (.39)  1.04 (.40) 
10
th-50
th   1.95 (.04)*  1.88 (.05)*  1.03 (.42)  1.14 (.33) 
10
th-60
th   1.92 (.05)*  2.33 (.01)*  .82 (.59)  1.16 (.32) 
10
th-70
th   2.42 (.01)*  2.54 (.01)*  .96 (.46)  1.49 (.16) 
10
th-80
th   2.61 (.00)*  2.17 (.02)*  1.80 (.08)*  1.55 (.14) 
10
th-90
th   2.34 (.01)*  1.91(.05)*  1.90 (.06)*  1.81 (.07)* 
20
th-30
th  .87 (.55)  .72 (.69)  .54 (.83)  1.69 (.10)* 
20
th-40
th   1.26 (.25)  .95 (.48)  .99 (.45)  1.19 (.30) 
20
th-50
th   .97 (.47)  1.12 (.35)  .72 (.67)  1.13 (.33) 
20
th-60
th   .80 (.62)  1.91 (.05)*  .50 (.86)  1.36 (.21) 
20
th-70
th   1.15 (.32)  2.08 (.03)*  .70 (.69)  1.24 (.27) 
20
th-80
th   1.73 (.08)*  1.95 (.04)*  1.18 (.31)  1.25 (.26) 
20
th-90
th   2.06 (.03)*  1.69 (.09)*  1.41 (.19)  1.51 (.15) 
30
th-40
th   .62 (.78)  .94 (.50)  .84 (.56)  .57 (.80) 
30
th-50
th   .52 (.86)  .82 (.60)  .54 (.82)  .63 (.75) 
30
th-60
th   .49 (.88)  1.12 (.34)  .21 (.98)  1.07 (.38) 
30
th-70
th   .77 (.65)  1.42 (.17)  .32 (.95)  1.49 (.16) 
30
th-80
th   1.38 (.19)  1.08 (.37)*  .57 (.56)  1.68 (.10)* 
30
th-90
th   2.14 (.02)*  1.25 (.37)  .85 (.56)  1.52 (.15) 
40
th-50
th   .35 (.96)  1.53 (.13)  .43 (.90)  .69 (.70) 
40
th-60
th   .75 (.66)  1.97 (.04)*  .21 (.99)  1.15 (.33) 
40
th-70
th   .91 (.51)  1.83 (.06)*  .08 (.99)  1.19 (.30) 
40
th-80
th   1.66 (.09)*  1.03 (.41)  .40 (.92)  1.15 (.33) 
40
th-90
th   2.12 (.02)*  1.31 (.23)  .78 (.62)  1.06 (.39) 
50
th-60
th   .82 (.60)  .85 (.57)  .13 (.99)  .63 (.75) 
50
th-70
th   1.01 (.43)  .66 (.74)  .41 (.91)  1.16 (.32) 
50
th-80
th   1.89 (.05)*  .55 (.83)  .72 (.67)  .83 (.58) 
50
th-90
th   1.45 (.16)  .88 (.55)  .79 (.61)  1.06 (.39) 
60
th-70
th   .63 (.77)  .47 (.89)  .64 (.74)  1.12 (.35) 
60
th-80
th   1.11 (.35)  .49 (.88)  .66 (.72)  .78 (.62) 
60
th-90
th   1.10 (.36)  .51 (.87)  1.04 (.41)  .73 (.66) 
70
th-80
th   .87 (.55)  .43 (.92)  .70 (.69)  .39 (.93) 
70
th-90
th   1.08 (.38)  .45 (.90)  1.17 (.32)  .53 (.83) 
80
th-90
th  .83 (.59)  .58 (.81)  .68 (.71)  .72 (.68) 
§  We carry out the test on the whole set of human capital variables: education, experience, 
experience*children, tenure, supervisory level. The null hypothesis  j i b b H 
 : 0  is tested against the 
alternative hypotheses  j i b b H  : 1   where i b is the vector of i-th decile coefficients related to human 
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